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People are often challenged to select one among several alternatives. This situa-
tion is present not only in decisions about complex issues, e.g., political or academic
choices, but also about trivial ones, as in daily purchases at a supermarket. We
tackle this scenario by means of the tools of statistical mechanics. Following this
approach, we introduce and analyze a model of opinion dynamics, using a Potts-like
state variable to represent the multiple choices, including the “undecided state”, that
represents the individuals that do not make a choice. We investigate the dynamics
over Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and Baraba´si-Albert networks, two paradigmatic classes with the
small-world property, and we show the impact of the type of network on the opin-
ion dynamics. Depending on the number of available options q and on the degree
distribution of the network of contacts, different final steady states are accessible:
from a wide distribution of choices to a state where a given option largely dominates.
The abrupt transition between them is consistent with the sudden viral dominance
of a given option over many similar ones. Moreover, the probability distributions
produced by the model are validated by real data. Finally, we show that the model
also contemplates the real situation of overchoice, where a large number of similar
alternatives makes the choice process harder and indecision prevail.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 89.65.-s, 02.70.Uu, 64.60.-i, 64.60.aq,
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2I. INTRODUCTION
People frequently face diverse situations that offer a wide choice of options, such as when
looking for a restaurant, hotel, phone model or any basic good in the supermarket. The
number of goods increases every day. It is estimated that approximately 50000 new products
are introduced every year in the US [1]. Even within each category of items, there may be
many brands and item variations without differentiated attractiveness. This leads to the
problem of facing too many choices, termed “overchoice” or choice overload [2]. To make
decisions in such situations can be costly, and this stressful process leads to poor decisions
or no decisions at all [3–5]. Then, the advantages of multiple choices can be canceled
by the disadvantages of a more complicated choice process. In fact, despite representing,
apparently, a positive development, many options may hinder the process of choice. For
example, people with many purchase options tend to have more difficulty in choosing and
may end up buying nothing [6]. Motivated by these observations, we wonder to what extent
people interactions, leaving aside their individual psychology, contribute to this scenario by
introducing, for instance, conflict and frustration. Then, by means of a model of opinion
dynamics, we investigate the distribution of adoptions made by a population facing a large
number of choices.
In modeling people’s interactions, one of the basic ingredients is imitation, or social con-
tagion. In fact, imitation occurs in diverse social contexts, from the dynamics of language
learning to decision making. Depending on the questions posed, diverse rules of conta-
gion, from simple pairwise to group interactions, have been proposed and studied in recent
years [7–26]. However, very few works deal with many choices [17, 18, 27, 28]. In the vast
majority of opinion models, the opinion of an agent is represented by a binary variable, since
many questions can be tackled through the assumption of two possible (opposite) attitudes,
e.g., being either favorable or unfavorable to a given choice. This kind of binary variable was
also inspired in the spin-1/2 Ising model, leading to transpose known results from physical
to social questions. For our present purpose of studying multiple-choice situations, it is
natural to consider a Potts-like state variable that can take several (discrete) values.
We consider that changes from one state to another are governed, not by simple pairwise
contagion, like in Refs. [18, 27, 28] but, instead, by a “plurality” rule [17]. This is grounded
on the idea that an individual makes the choice that is the most popular among its contacts.
3In fact, when we have to choose or buy something, especially when there are so many similar
options that there is not a favorite one a priori and is not feasible to examine them all, it
is reasonable to take into account other people’s preferences [29]. Naturally, the closer
is the person in our network of contacts, more importance we give to its opinion, since
nearest neighbors in the network typically have similar interests and tastes. One can use
that strategy not only in trivial or daily life issues but also in major ones such as political
elections where many candidates compete. For changing or adopting a new opinion, however,
a minimum of consensus amongst the contacts is necessary. This is expressed in a plurality
rule, according to which an individual is persuaded to adopt the opinion shared by the
largest number of its nearest neighbors.
Evolution rules based on a locally dominant opinion have been considered before, for in-
stance, the majority rule for two states introduced by Galam [19, 20]. It was later extended
to multistate opinions [17], by considering all-to-all interactions where the individual and
all its contacts adopt the same opinion of the majority at the same time. A variant where,
instead of the local majority, the plurality opinion is considered was also studied [17]. But
in the situations we address here, the decisions are not taken in groups or simultaneously,
rather the choices of the individuals are affected by their knowledge of the previous choices
of theirs contacts. Therefore, we assume that one single individual opinion changes at a
time. Moreover, we will include the possibility of undecided people, which is a realistic
feature, which has been taken into account in 3-state models, as natural extensions of bi-
nary cases [22–24, 30–32]. Furthermore, as another differential, the dynamics of our model
takes place in small-world networks, that, even if do not facilitate analytic treatment, are
more realistic than regular or mean-field settings. As paradigms of small-world networks,
we consider two classes with distinct degree distributions: Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) [33, 34] and
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) [35] networks. The details of the model will be defined in Sec. II.
The model encompasses instances where the different alternatives have similar initial
attractiveness. Many products sold in the internet with similar qualities and prices, e.g.,
music albums, shoes, etc., are within the model scope. We also make the simplification that
individuals can differ only in the number of contacts. Other heterogeneities of the agents
might be also introduced in further work. By now, we ask a basic question: how a plurality
rule molds the decision spectrum in the simplest, homogeneous, case?
First, we address the classical issue in this kind of problems, about whether a consensus
4state can be achieved or not, where all (or almost all) of the individuals share the same
preference. Then, in simulations of the model, we compute the fraction of the realizations
reaching consensus. In non-consensus situations, we analyze the distribution of adoptions.
We also compute other relevant quantities such as the fraction of undecided people and
the fraction of the population adopting the most popular alternative. The results will be
presented in Sec. III.
II. PLURALITY MODELING
A plurality rule governs the opinion dynamics of N agents interacting through their
network of contacts. Each agent i, corresponding to a node in the network, has a Potts-
like opinion state variable Si, that can take the values s1, . . . , sq representing q electable
alternatives (options or choices, that we enumerate in an arbitrary order), as well as an
“undecided” state s0, assessed when the individual has not adopted a defined option. The
addition of the undecided state reflects the fact that sometimes people do not have a favorite
choice.
We focus on the dynamics developed in ER and BA networks, as representative of small-
world networks with homogeneous and heterogeneous degree distributions, respectively.
However, for comparative purposes we will also consider random neighbors and nearest
neighbors in a square lattice (with periodic boundary conditions).
We assume that most individuals do not have a formed opinion a priori, except for
initiators representative of each offered choice. Then, we start the dynamics with all nodes
in the S = s0 state, except randomly chosen q nodes, to each of which we attribute a
different opinion S = s1, . . . , sq. We consider the same number of initiators (one initiator)
for each alternative, reflecting the equivalent attractiveness of all the alternatives. This kind
of initial state has been used in opinion models for proportional elections [36].
At each Monte Carlo (MC) step of the dynamics, we visit all the nodes of the network
in a random order and update them successively, in asynchronous mode. The state of the
visited node i is updated according to the following steps:
(i) We define the set of nodes, Ai, formed by i and its nearest neighbors.
(ii) We determine the plurality state Spi 6= s0, associated to node i, as the state shared by
5the largest number of nodes in the set Ai.
(iii) The agent i will then adopt its corresponding plurality state.
Notice that, when we measure the state Spi , we ignore the nodes in Ai that have S = s0
(see Fig. 1) but the current opinion of site i also counts to define Spi .
The updates are repeated and the dynamics stops when an absorbing state is attained,
i.e., if, at a MC step, none of the nodes changes its state.
Let us remark that this dynamics differs from that of the Sznajd type [37, 38] where two
or more individuals sharing the same opinion impose it to all their neighbors. It also differs
in several aspects from the plurality rule introduced in Ref. [17]: i) while in our case only the
central node is affected, in [17] the whole group Ai changes its opinion to the plurality state
Spi in a single update step, ii) here the size of the interaction group Ai is given by G = ki+1,
where ki is the connectivity of site i, instead of being constant (anyway, the parameter 〈k〉+1
plays the role of an effective G, and they coincide in the limit of a highly homogeneous, or
regular, network); iii) the possibility of indecision is not contemplated in [17]; iv) in an
event of tie, the opinion of node i remains unchanged in our model, while, in [17], one of the
s0
s0
s0
s0
s7 s7
s3
s3
s3
s3
s3
s2
t t + 1
FIG. 1. Illustration of the model rule. In a given instant t, a node i (the central one in the figure)
and its neighbors form a group Ai. In the case shown in the figure, the plurality state is Spi = s3,
since this is the state which is shared by more nodes. So, in the next time step, the node i changes
its opinion from s2 to s3. Notice that nodes with S = s0 are ignored in the computation of the
plurality state Spi .
6dominant options is randomly selected. With respect to this last item, the present dynamics
is more close to the majority rule version of Ref. [17], where the dynamics becomes static
because, when there is no local majority, the state of the group does not change. v) In terms
of the underlying network, here we consider small-world networks, while the dynamics in
Ref. [17] was studied in the mean-field limit and over a square lattice. vi) Finally, another
important difference is in the initial conditions: we consider that decided nodes are diluted
in a sea of undecided nodes, instead of equiprobability of definite opinions.
III. RESULTS
A. Plurality dynamics
We follow the evolution of each realization of the dynamics until the final state is at-
tained. Distinct distributions of opinions can emerge in the final state depending on the
amount of alternatives q, the average connectivity 〈k〉, the network topology and size N .
Fig. 2 illustrates the evolution of ns, the number of nodes that share the same opinion s, in
representative realizations of the dynamics on ER networks of size N = 104. A final state is
reached in a few Monte-Carlo iterations.
Fig. 2 illustrates the distinct patterns that can arise, while the full phenomenology as a
function of the model parameter q and network features will be shown in Sec. III B.
(a) For instance, when q = 20 and 〈k〉 = 4, we have a fragmented final state, where all initial
values of S have adopters. The number of undecided agents is predominant, representing
about 20% of the population, in this particular realization.
(b) For larger connectivity (e.g., 〈k〉 = 8), several opinions are still possible in the stationary
state, but the winner opinion sw is widely dominant. The number of undecided agents in
the steady state has decreased significantly with respect to case (a).
(c) For even larger connectivity (e.g., 〈k〉 = 30), consensus is likely.
(d)-(f) When q is large, the number of undecided agents does not decrease monotonously
when the connectivity increases. But, increasing the connectivity, consensus is reached,
although it can take a larger time than for small q.
In all cases, the number of undecided nodes decreases with time, because undecided
individuals are not produced by the dynamics in the present version of the model, but only
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FIG. 2. Time evolution of ns, the number of nodes that share the same opinion s, for an ER
network of size N = 104. For q = 20, all opinions are shown, while for q = 1000, only the winner
opinion and other 20 opinions are shown. The winner opinion S = sw, as well as the opinion S = s0
(undecided state) are highlighted. The level 50% of the population is represented by black dotted
lines. The stationary state is attained in a few MC steps and distinct patterns arise for different
values of 〈k〉 and q.
introduced in the initial condition.
The dynamics in ER networks can be qualitatively understood as follows:
In a first regime, each opinion propagates invading the undecided neighbors. If the
initiators are very diluted (q  N), and the connectivity is not too high, then each cluster of
nodes with the same opinion can develop almost independently of each other, during several
MC steps (non-competitive regime). In this case, the initial growth is nearly exponential,
described approximately by dns/dt = 〈k〉ns in ER networks.
When two or more clusters collide, a competitive regime starts. Depending on the net-
work, the competition can take place more or less evenly so that ties stagnate the evolution
avoiding wide dominance of a given opinion (as in Fig. 2.a, 2.d and 2.e). Otherwise, a sort
8of rich-get-richer or cumulative advantage mechanism can take place. In that case, the win-
ner opinion becomes noticeably larger than other ones, convincing individuals from other
opinion clusters (Fig. 2.b) or even the whole network (Fig. 2.c).
Similar patterns as those shown for ER networks are also observed for BA networks,
although for different values of the parameters, as illustrated in the first column of Fig. 3.
Notice that the winner opinion, as well as the number of decided people, for the same param-
eters, are favored in BA networks, where cumulative advantage effects are more accentuated.
Let us remark that in some extreme situations, given the initial conditions studied here
(one initiator for each state), the system does not evolve. This occurs, for instance, in the
limit case when q = N (hence, each individual has a defined opinion) or the connectivity of
all sites is N − 1 (complete graph). In those extreme cases, ties forbid changes of state and
the dynamics is frozen from the start. However, we will restrict the range of the parameters
to the region q, 〈k〉  N .
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(b) SQ q = 20 (c) MF K = 4; q = 20
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(d) BA 〈k〉 = 4; q = 1000
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(f) MF K = 4; q = 1000
otherwise
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FIG. 3. Time evolution of ns, with the same conventions of Fig. 2, for BA networks, square lattices
(SQ) and mean-field (MF) interactions (random networks) for the parameters indicated in the
figure. In panels (b) and (e) the purple dashed lines are given by Eq. 1. In all cases N = 104.
9Aside from networks with the small-world property (ER and BA), we also analyzed,
for comparison, interactions with (i) first neighbors in square (SQ) lattices (with periodic
boundary conditions), and (ii) K random neighbors (with K > 1). Representative examples
of the evolution, in square lattices and K random neighbors for the case K = 4, are shown
in the second and third columns of Fig. 3.
In regular lattices, the evolution is essentially non-competitive. Clusters grow from their
initiators and, when they collide, the dynamics freezes due to ties in the interfaces, without
entering a competitive phase, in contrast to ER and BA networks where there are long-
range links that break ties. Since the initial growth occurs at the surface of the cluster, then
dns ∝ √ns which, differently from small-world networks, gives a quadratic increase of ns
with t, as observed in Fig. 3 (second column). Alternatively, it is easy to show that, for the
synchronized update, at short times, the number of adopters of each choice grows around its
initiator, following, in average, the recursion relation ns(t) = ns(t − 1) + Kt, where K = 4
for the square lattice. By solving this recursion equation, one obtains
ns(t) = ns(0)[1 +Kt(t+ 1)/2], (1)
that yields the predicted quadratic increase with t, valid for small t, until ns ' N/q holds.
Despite the prediction is done for the synchronous update, it is in good agreement with the
average value of the simulated curves, as can be seen in the second column of Fig. 3.
As a consequence of the lack of competition, the final values of ns are less disperse in the
square lattice than in random networks and, mainly, consensus, or even a wide dominance
of an opinion, becomes unlikely for q > 1.
In the absence of any network structure (i.e., when neighbors are chosen purely randomly),
like in the examples of the last column of Fig. 3, one of the opinions dominates and attains
consensus, even for very small K. This can be understood in terms of a mean-field approach,
following the lines of Ref. [17]. In fact, the fraction of undecided sites f0 = ns0/N follows
an equation of the type
f˙0 = −f0PK−1(f0) , (2)
where PK−1 is a polynomial of order K − 1 in f0 whose coefficients depend on the fractions
fs ≡ nS/N , with S = s1, . . . , sq and PK−1(0) > 0. For all K and q, the factor f0 arises
from the central undecided node that is part of the group. Therefore, in the steady state it
must be f0 = 0. Moreover, since PK−1(0) > 0, Eq. (2) is stable for f0 = 0. The remaining
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equations for the other fractions fs have solutions of the type found in Ref. [17] for their
majority and plurality versions. In particular, the stable solutions are those of consensus,
where fsj=1 for some j (hence, the remaining fractions vanish).
For instance, for K = 2 and q = 2 (let us call fsj ≡ fj, 0 ≤ j ≤ q), we have
f˙0 = −f0[f 21 + f 22 + 2(f1 + f2)f0] ,
f˙1 = f0f1(2f0 + f1) + f1f2(f1 − f2) ,
f˙2 = f0f2(2f0 + f2) + f1f2(f2 − f1) .
It is easy to obtain that the only stable solutions are (f0, f1, f2) = (0, 0, 1) and (f0, f1, f2) =
(0, 1, 0).
Similarly, for K = 3 and q = 2, once f0 = 0, we have
f˙1 = f1f2(f1 − f2)(f1 + f2) ,
f˙2 = f1f2(f2 − f1)(f1 + f2) ,
that lead to the consensus solutions as the stable ones, while equipartition f1 = f2 = 1/2 is
unstable. The equations above, for small values of K and q, valid for f0 = 0 in the present
model, are the same obtained for the majority and plurality versions studied in Ref. [17],
although the equations in three cases differ for enough large values of K and q.
Increasing K leads to equations of the form f˙1 = f1f2(f1− f2)PK−2(f1), where PK−2 is a
definite positive polynomial of order K−2 in f1, whose coefficients depend on f2. Therefore,
consensus is always stable for q = 2.
For large number of alternatives, f0 necessarily must vanish as well, and consensus is also
a stable solution. For instance when q = 3 and K = 2, once f0 = 0, we have
f˙1 = f
2
1 (f2 + f3)− f1(f 22 + f 23 ) ,
f˙2 = f
2
2 (f3 + f1)− f2(f 23 + f 21 ) ,
f˙3 = f
2
3 (f1 + f2)− f3(f 21 + f 22 ) ,
that lead to the consensus solutions as the stable ones, while equipartition f1 = f2 = f3 = 1/3
is unstable, and the solutions of the type (f1, f2, f3) = (0, 1/2, 1/2) are saddle points.
Increasing q and K, the structure of fixed points becomes more complex and more routes
to consensus emerge [17]. Nonetheless, consensus is always the final state, which was also
verified through numerical simulations.
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Differently, when the structure of the interaction network is relevant, non-trivial behaviors
occur, as those illustrated in Fig. 2. A population of undecided people can survive and
consensus is not always attained.
B. Phase diagram
To summarize, the nontrivial final configurations that emerge in ER and BA networks, we
built a phase diagram in the plane 〈k〉 − q. For each realization, we monitored the fraction
of decided people
fd ≡ nd/N ≡ (N − ns0)/N , (3)
and also the fraction of nodes sharing the most adopted opinion, or winner choice,
fw ≡ nsw/N . (4)
These quantities were averaged at the final state of several realizations. Unless said
something different, at least 50 realizations were considered for each set of values of the
parameters. For each realization of the dynamics, a different network was generated. The
averaged fractions will be denoted by fd and fw, respectively.
We also computed the fraction pc of the simulations that reach consensus (operationally
meaning at least 99% of the population).
When performing computations over ER networks, only the main component of the graph
was considered.
The phase diagram in the plane of parameters 〈k〉 − q, for ER and BA networks is
depicted in Fig. 4. We restricted the analysis to the region q ≤ N/10 and 〈k〉 ≤ N/1000.
The diagram shows the changeover from regions of consensus to regions of fragmented final
state, as indicated by the colors from red to blue. Filled symbols emphasize the points
where consensus is certain (pc = 1, red) or uncertain (pc = 0, blue). Moreover, the solid
lines depict the frontier where fw = 0.5 (fw > 0.5 to the right of the curves), and the
shadowed areas highlight the points for which undecided people are majority (fd < 0.5). It
is clear that the consensus domain (pc ' 1, red region) is larger for BA networks, pointing
out that heterogeneity favors consensus. In both ER and BA networks, inserting a few links,
for fixed q near the transition frontier, may trigger consensus.
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FIG. 4. Phase diagram in the plane 〈k〉−q showing the fraction of consensus pc in color scale. Full
symbols emphasize the points where consensus occurs in all (pc = 1, dark red) and none (pc = 0,
dark blue) of the 30 realizations for each cell, otherwise symbols are empty. The solid lines depict
the points such that fw = 0.5 (fw > 0.5 to the right of the curves). The shadowed areas represent
the points for which fd < 0.5. ER and BA networks size is N = 10
5.
In BA networks, for sufficiently large q (>∼ 200) the critical value 〈k〉c ' 7 becomes
independent of q. In contrast, in ER networks, the dependence on q is stronger. The
non-consensus domain for ER networks, (pc ' 0, blue region), when q becomes sufficiently
large, spreads over the region of large mean connectivities. It means, that near the transition
frontier, eliminating a few alternatives can trigger consensus, an effect which in BA networks
only occurs for connectivities below 〈k〉c ' 7 .
Concomitantly, in the shadowed area in Fig. 4.a., the fraction of decided people becomes
minority (fd < 0.5). Differently, in the BA case, the majority of nodes is decided over the
whole phase diagram. Moreover, even in the absence of consensus, the winner group can
become majority (fw > 0.5), more easily in BA networks.
In the following sections III C and III D, we describe in more detail the dependency on q
and 〈k〉, respectively.
C. Effect of the number of options q
In this section, we focus on the impact of the number of opinions q on the steady state,
and we also discuss size effects.
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Fig. 5 shows the three quantities of interest, fd, fw and pc, as a function of q, for ER
and BA networks and SQ lattices of three different sizes. The plots of pc vs q, for ER and
BA networks, correspond to vertical cuts of the phase diagram in Fig. 4. All the fractions
monotonically decrease with q, in the studied range, indicating that independently of the
lattice, increasing the number of options hinder the process of decision making, promoting
indecision, and also turning more difficult the appearance of a popular choice.
Concerning size effects, in ER networks (panel a), the three quantities are almost inde-
pendent of size N .
The results in square lattices (panel c) are in accord with the predictions made in
Sec. III A. For instance, pc > 0 only for q = 1. The winner fraction fw is independent
of L and decays subtly above 1/q, as expected. In fact, we have seen that the fractions of
each opinion have a narrow distribution around the mean value 1/q. Meanwhile, the decided
fraction fd depends on L. Since undecided sites are at the interfaces of each opinion cluster,
then, their quantity over all q clusters is ns0 ∝
√
L2/q×q/2. Therefore, the decided fraction
fd = 1− ns0/L2 results
fd = 1−
√
q/L2/2 . (5)
As a consequence, the curves of fd for different sizes collapse when represented vs q/L
2, as
shown in the inset of Fig. 5.c.
In contrast, in BA networks (panel b), pc and fw also depend on N . Moreover, fw does
not vanish but tends to a finite value as q increases. The heterogeneity of these networks
favors that the winner conquers a large domain, which increases with system size. The
decided fraction fd also depends on N and data approximately collapse when represented vs
q/Nα, with α ' 0.35± 0.05 for the case of Fig. 5.b (see inset). This value of α suggests that
the number of “interfacial” nodes scales with the number of bulk nodes in a cluster with
exponent 1 − α ' 0.65. The fraction fw, as well as the critical value at which pc vanishes,
follow the same scaling, as shown in the inset of Fig. 5.b.
The average fraction of decided people fd typically decreases with q (for q  N), but
a kind of saturation effect occurs for large enough q and a flat level appears in small-
world networks, indicating that fd becomes insensitive to the introduction of new choices.
However, the value of the flat level changes with the network connectivity (not shown). For
large number of options q, the values of fd are smaller in ER networks. Heterogeneity of
degrees seems to be helpful in breaking ties. In the heterogeneous BA networks, many nodes
14
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FIG. 5. Average fraction of decided people fd (triangles), average fraction of the winner choice
fw (squares), and fraction of realizations reaching consensus pc (circles), as a function of the
number of different opinions q. Three different sizes were used for ER and BA networks with mean
connectivity 〈k〉 = 4, and for square lattices. The number of nodes N is given for networks and
the linear size L for lattices. Solid lines are a guide to the eye, and shadowed regions represent
the standard deviations of fd and fw in the case N = 10
5 (that are similar for the other sizes). In
panel (c), the dashed line corresponds to 1/q. Computations were done over at least 50 samples.
The insets show the data collapse, as explained in the text: in (b), α = 0.35; in (c), the dashed
line is given by Eq. (5).
have low connectivity and can be easily convinced by a decided neighbor. On the other hand,
the occurrence of a local plurality is less likely in an homogeneous ER network with a given
connectivity. As a consequence, ties are more frequent, more nodes remain undecided and
the dynamics freezes. However, in square lattices, despite the homogeneity, the undecided
fraction is relatively small. This can be understood as follows. Ties occur when distinct
opinion clusters collide, then, the surviving undecided nodes are located at the “interfaces”.
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In networks with long-range links the encounter of different clusters occurs early, and many
nodes remain undecided, meanwhile in regular lattices with nearest-neighbor interactions,
undecided nodes are being conquered until the collision, late in the dynamics, when the
opinion groups have occupied most of the lattice and few undecided nodes remain at the
interfaces.
The average fraction of the population adopting the winner option, fw (squares) is also a
significant quantity. (Necessarily fw ≤ fd.) The fraction fw is greater in BA networks. That
is, the winner choice conquers in average a large fraction of the population in BA networks,
compared to ER networks and square lattices with equivalent 〈k〉. In fact, the cumulative
advantage that drives the growth of an opinion group is facilitated in these heterogeneous
networks due to the presence of hubs, and the winner conquers more adopters. Also notice
that, in ER networks, when the fraction fd attains the flat level, a dominant opinion is
absent, as mirrored by the very small value of fw (see Fig. 5.a). Meanwhile, in BA networks
the winner can always conquer an important fraction of the population (Fig. 5.b), shown by
the fact that fw remains finite (except in the limit q → N).
For all kinds of networks, the probability of occurrence of consensus, pc (circles), typically
falls from 1 to 0 as q increases. This agrees with the intuition that, when there are more
options to choose, it is more difficult to attain consensus. The probability of consensus
decays rapidly with q and, above a critical value qc, the fraction pc becomes negligibly small.
This effect is accentuated in the square lattice where for qc = 1.
D. Effect of the mean connectivity 〈k〉
The behavior of the characteristic fractions fd, fw and pc as a function of the average
connectivity of the network, 〈k〉, are shown in Fig. 6, for several values of q, in ER and
BA networks. The plots of pc vs 〈k〉 correspond to horizontal cuts of the phase diagram in
Fig. 4.
Let us start by the case of BA networks (shown in Fig. 6.b) that exhibits a simple
monotonic behavior, for the range shown in the figure. The three fractions increase with the
connectivity. As observed in the phase diagram of Fig. 4.b, Fig. 6.b shows in more detail
how the jump to consensus becomes more abrupt as q increases and the critical value of
the connectivity becomes nearly independent of the number of options (〈k〉c ' 7), as also
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observed in the phase diagram.
Differently, in ER networks (see Fig. 6.a), 〈k〉c increases with q. Moreover, the average
fraction of decided people fd first decreases with the connectivity down to a minimal value
localized at 〈k〉min. Up to that point, the fraction of simulations attaining consensus pc is
negligibly small. But, at 〈k〉min, a transition occurs and both pc and fd rapidly increase
with 〈k〉, up to 1. One would expect to have more decided nodes when the connectivity is
higher, like in the case of BA networks, since, in principle, more connections might facilitate
information spreading. However, on a low connected network, opinion groups are typically
isolated from each other. When links are added, and disconnected groups become connected,
ties can occur. That is, on the one hand higher connectivity implies that groups of different
opinions can be more connected among them and compete. On the other, a node will be
aware of more opinions, making difficult the decision and keeping more undecided nodes.
Therefore, not only overchoice (high q) may produce stagnation of the dynamics but also
“overlink” or excess of contacts due to high 〈k〉. This explains the initial decrease of fd
with 〈k〉 which occurs up to a minimal value of fd. After that point, introducing more
connections will allow a dominant group to impose its opinion, concomitantly pc increases
until reaching its maximal value 1. Also notice that in ER networks, for large values of q,
there is an interval of mean connectivity for which the fraction of decided people becomes
minority.
The existence of an abrupt transition from a situation where many opinions coexist to
consensus indicates that, by adding just a few links or by removing a few choices, most peo-
ple may come to adopt the same state. The transition to consensus is more abrupt in BA
networks, and the jump width decreases with q. In these networks, as discussed above, there
is a dominant winner opinion group, that represents an important fraction of the population
(finite fw). The largest group gains additional adopters more easily, with cumulative ad-
vantage. Near the critical connectivity, when adding few links at random, it would be more
probable to connect the very large group to smaller ones, and, as a consequence, they would
be conquered by the dominant opinion, rapidly leading to consensus. In homogeneous ER
networks this transition is less abrupt, because a largely dominant group is less probable.
The width of the transition region slightly increases with q. For the extreme case of nearest
neighbors interactions in square lattices, cumulative effects are completely absent, therefore,
a transition to consensus is unlikely.
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FIG. 6. Fractions fd (full lines) and pc (dotted lines) as a function of the mean connectivity
〈k〉, for several values of q, indicated by different colors, in ER (a) and BA (b) networks of size
N = 105. For the sake of clearness, the behavior of the winner fraction fw (black dotted lines) is
depicted only for the case q = 1000. Averages where computed over at least 50 samples.
E. Distribution of opinions and empirical data
In non-consensus steady states, a broad distribution of opinions across the population
can emerge. In order to analyze the shape of the distributions, we built the normalized
histograms of P (ns), where ns is the number of nodes with a given opinion s. Histograms
were computed by accumulating realizations ending in non-consensus states. Typical dis-
tributions are depicted in Fig. 7. One can identify exponential, log-normal and power-law
behaviors.
In the ER case, far enough from the critical frontier of consensus, the preferences are
almost uniformly distributed with an exponential cutoff. When approaching consensus (for
instance by increasing 〈k〉) the distribution adopts a log-normal shape. Notice that this
occurs in the region of the phase diagram where indecision prevails (shadowed area in Fig. 4).
In BA networks, the distribution can also resemble a log-normal, but when approaching
consensus the tail rises due to the existence of dominant winners. Moreover, when the
dynamics freezes early, P (ns) tends to reflect the degree distribution with exponent −3.
In order to compare the distributions from simulations with those from real world, we
considered products than are rated online. We analyzed data about items whose alternatives
are not significantly differentiated (for instance, in price and/or quality), as assumed in our
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FIG. 7. Distribution of the number of nodes that adopted a given opinion ns, P (ns), built over
50 samples, for q = 2000, on ER (a) and BA (b) networks with size N = 105, and different values
of 〈k〉 indicated on the figure. The solid lines are log-normal fits, the dotted lines exponential fits,
and the dashed line with slope -3 was drawn for comparison.
model. We identified q with the number of items within each category and we considered
the amount of positive reviews (those of 4 and 5 stars) received by each item as indicator
of its total number of adopters, that potentially might become spreaders of the product,
in a situation alike that described by the present model. We analyzed all music albums
from Google Play music [40], whose prices are similar (U$ 9 ± 3). We also analyzed male
sneakers from Netshoes [39], a Brazilian e-commerce for sport goods. Since in this case
the prices are more disperse, we split the data into two subsets: items with prices below
and above the median (about R$ 200). For each set of data we computed the histogram
of the number of adoptions (i.e., number of reviews attributing 4 and 5 stars), as shown in
Fig. 8. Comparison of Figs. 7 and 8 put into evidence a remarkable qualitative similarity
between real and simulated distributions producing log-normal shapes. The shape for small
values of ns is also similar. Once service users have access to the reviews of any other user,
the underlying network is expected to be similar to a random graph with relatively high
connectivity. Since purely random (mean-field) interactions would lead to consensus, which
is not observed in empirical data, one concludes that the underlying network must have some
structure. The absence of a fat tail, related to the presence of hubs, as in BA networks,
indicates that the empirical cases are best modeled by ER networks, at least qualitatively.
In fact, in a “rating network”, reviews are equivalent and none of them is expected to act
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FIG. 8. Distribution P (ns), of the number of (favorable) reviews ns, with 4 and 5 stars, for
Netshoes [39] and Google Play music [40]. It is reasonable to identify the number of items with q,
and the number of reviews giving 4 and 5 stars with the number of decided people nd. For Google
Play musics, prices are similar (U$ 9± 3), then all data were used (nd ' 1.6× 106; q ' 7500). For
Netshows we split the data into two subsets: items with prices above (nd ' 9× 104; q ' 1720) and
below (nd ' 105; q ' 1720) the median (' R$ 200). The solid lines are log-normal fits.
as a hub, then, it is reasonable that ER networks yield more realistic results in this case.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
We introduced a model based on a plurality rule, that mimics decision making governed
by the influence of the relative majority of the neighbors. The model also incorporates
the possibility of undecided agents. It applies not only to situations involving consume of
products or services but also to other environments where there is a variety of options, as
far as the options are homogeneous with similar attractiveness (similar quality, cost, etc.)
and people have no preferred choice a priori.
Different final steady states emerge from the dynamics, depending on the number of
available options and on the degree distribution of the network of contacts: consensus, wide
distribution of opinions or also situations where indecision dominates for sufficiently large
number of options. In fact, decision making governed by the plurality rule may yield ties
(conflict and frustration), contributing to overchoice stagnation. This effect appears to be
mitigated in BA networks. The model envisages that stagnation may result not only from
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overchoice but also from the excess of links (see Fig. 6.a).
For both types of small-world networks, consensus is almost certain for sufficiently low
number of options and sufficiently large connectivity. For ER networks, consensus can occur
even if there are many options available. If neighbors are random, consensus is the rule. But
consensus is unlikely for large number of options and low network connectivity, specially if the
network is homogeneous. In the square lattice with periodic boundary conditions consensus
is not reached, but opinions tend to be equipartitioned. In small-world networks, there are
nontrivial non-consensus regimes, and a broad distribution of opinions can emerge, with a
shape similar to that of real ones when the assumptions of homogeneity hold, like in the
examples of Netshoes and Google music albums.
The model indicates that consensus can suddenly emerge simply by introducing a few
connections or eliminating a few items. Furthermore, it also predicts that an item can
become very popular (with relatively large fw), even if the initial attractiveness of all the
items is uniform. These observations furnish another possible explanation of why there is so
much amateur content viralizing in the Internet, or why a service, good or cultural product
can become a bestseller without having any apparent differentiated attractiveness.
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